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Fig. 15.6 (a) Time of day effects for Web traf c in June 1995 CMU dataset. (b) Time of day and day of week effects for Web traf c in external AT&T dataset.

requests, then distinguishing between the application types, next considering application-speci c arrivals over time periods of various length, and nally we present time-dependent models for only a subset of the sources. While one might argue that we are planning to present the most useful models last (after all, arrivals are dependent on the time of day), we choose this order to familiarize the reader with the data and some graphical tools. 15.5.3 All Interarrival Times

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The second set of attacks involves Java code that passes itself off as belonging to the browser. In early versions of the JDK (before Java 2), code that came with the browser was assumed to be safe (see 2 and [McGraw and Felten, 1996]). The original built-in code distinction was scrapped with the introduction of code signing, and these days very little code is trusted (see 3). In any case, the Slash and Burn fraud allows the malicious code access it would not ordinarily have. It could, for example, access files on the local disk. In order to properly understand this attack, you need to understand how Java works. In particular, examine how Java accesses its own code on the browser's local disk.

The rst quantity of interest is the shape and the characteristics of the empirical cumulative distribution of all interarrival times. Figure 15.7 shows the empirical density function for the CMU trace from 29 to 30 June 1995 and for the external AT&T trace from 18 November to 8 December 1995. Although the empirical density is fairly smooth, there are quite a few spikes, especially for the small interarrival times. The spikes in the small interarrival times are due to timer resolution problems and simultaneous arrival of connections.

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INFORMATION REQUEST FROM STORE #101

When a Java applet runs, many Java classes (pieces of Java code) are loaded and run. Some applet-related classes are loaded by the applet, using the Web server. Other classes are part of the browser itself. Browserrelated code is stored with the browser on the local disk. Netscape, for example, keeps its Java class files zipped up in an archive called classes.zip. When Netscape is installed, the class archive needs to be put somewhere special, like /usr/local/lib/netscape on Unix machines. Because the browser classes were considered part of the trusted browser program, they were given more privileges. (This is no longer the case.) In general, before JDK 1.1, Java treated code loaded from the local disk as trusted, and code loaded over the Net as untrusted. That meant if an attacker could somehow get some malicious code loaded from the local disk, the attacker was home free. The original system was changed significantly with the introduction

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of JDK 1.0.2, which stopped treating code loaded off the disk as trusted. This change was made behind the scenes with little fanfare. As the Cache Cramming attack (explained later) shows, many people were confused by the change. From our discussion of the Java class loader in 2, we know that when Java needs to find a piece of code, say, for a class MyClass, it first looks on the local disk for a file called MyClass.class. If Java fails to find an appropriate file on the local disk, then it tries to fetch the file from the Web server that originally provided the applet. We've glossed over one key issue at this point: How does Java know what class to look for The answer is that a class is only loaded when it is mentioned by another class already resident. This is called dynamic loading. The name of the mentioned class is stored in the Java code for the mentioning class. Java classes have names like security.book.chapter5. When the Java system wants to look up a class on the disk, it translates the dots in the class name into backslashes. The name security.book.chapter5 becomes security\book\chapter5.2 This transformed name is the filename used to search for the file on the local disk.

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DATA Store #101 Ledger 102 Denied DAILY LEDGER STORE #101 DENY ALL-ELSE ALLOW SOURCE STORE,HQ Access Granted

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